1 00:00:01,130 --> 00:00:14,410 [Music] 2 00:00:25,240 --> 00:00:22,710 I joined the Apollo Saturn program in 3 00:00:29,320 --> 00:00:25,250 1962 right after I graduated from 4 00:00:30,580 --> 00:00:29,330 Georgia Tech I later got a master's 5 00:00:32,620 --> 00:00:30,590 degree at the University of Southern 6 00:00:35,350 --> 00:00:32,630 California PhD from the University of 7 00:00:38,950 --> 00:00:35,360 Texas a little later in my in my career 8 00:00:40,960 --> 00:00:38,960 but you know the everybody was really 9 00:00:43,690 --> 00:00:40,970 enthused about the space program in 10 00:00:47,560 --> 00:00:43,700 those days of course and I'd heard a lot 11 00:00:50,110 --> 00:00:47,570 about it while I was in school Kennedy's 12 00:00:53,500 --> 00:00:50,120 speech and it was obvious that there was 13 00:00:56,410 --> 00:00:53,510 a lot of enthusiasm there and I decided 14 00:00:59,319 --> 00:00:56,420 I would join Rocketdyne and work on the 15 00:01:01,029 --> 00:00:59,329 program I was actually hired into the h1 16 00:01:05,620 --> 00:01:01,039 engine program h1 engines were the 17 00:01:11,050 --> 00:01:05,630 engines for the Saturn one 1b and when I 18 00:01:15,040 --> 00:01:11,060 got there in mid 62 June 6 do you think 19 00:01:18,250 --> 00:01:15,050 was the engine was undergoing an upgrade 20 00:01:21,550 --> 00:01:18,260 it had been qualified for 188 thousand 21 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:21,560 pounds of thrust and they decided it 22 00:01:24,880 --> 00:01:23,210 needed more capability into boosters so 23 00:01:28,510 --> 00:01:24,890 they had upgraded it to two hundred and 24 00:01:30,359 --> 00:01:28,520 eight thousand pounds when they did that 25 00:01:32,679 --> 00:01:30,369 they had to redesign a lot of components 26 00:01:35,889 --> 00:01:32,689 so essentially we had to completely 27 00:01:38,350 --> 00:01:35,899 recoil fire the engine and that was just 28 00:01:41,800 --> 00:01:38,360 beginning to be started when when I got 29 00:01:44,020 --> 00:01:41,810 there and after being in the program 30 00:01:47,380 --> 00:01:44,030 office for I think it was three or four 31 00:01:50,230 --> 00:01:47,390 or five months I went to work on a test 32 00:01:52,450 --> 00:01:50,240 stand in Santa Susana I was responsible 33 00:01:55,450 --> 00:01:52,460 development engineer on a test and that 34 00:02:00,069 --> 00:01:55,460 was doing the testing to requalified the 35 00:02:03,060 --> 00:02:00,079 h1 and it was a fantastic experience I 36 00:02:05,889 --> 00:02:03,070 had never been around anything like that 37 00:02:08,020 --> 00:02:05,899 but we were trying to get a lot of tests 38 00:02:10,210 --> 00:02:08,030 though because you had requirements some 39 00:02:12,550 --> 00:02:10,220 time on hardware and number of firings 40 00:02:13,930 --> 00:02:12,560 and those kind of things we actually had 41 00:02:17,140 --> 00:02:13,940 two test stands there running at the 42 00:02:19,410 --> 00:02:17,150 same time and so we were getting just as 43 00:02:23,770 --> 00:02:19,420 many tests as we could off and typically 44 00:02:25,839 --> 00:02:23,780 two a day was about all you could do we 45 00:02:26,630 --> 00:02:25,849 would run in the morning I'd go back to 46 00:02:31,280 --> 00:02:26,640 the 47 00:02:34,100 --> 00:02:31,290 course everything was on strip charts 48 00:02:36,470 --> 00:02:34,110 and asila graphs in those days and I had 49 00:02:37,970 --> 00:02:36,480 two ladies who would reduce the data and 50 00:02:41,000 --> 00:02:37,980 while they were reducing data I was 51 00:02:43,520 --> 00:02:41,010 reviewing Isetta graphs and and also the 52 00:02:46,699 --> 00:02:43,530 strip charts he usually took me about 53 00:02:47,930 --> 00:02:46,709 maybe two hours to do that and then we'd 54 00:02:50,949 --> 00:02:47,940 start getting ready for the afternoon 55 00:02:56,090 --> 00:02:50,959 test and same thing over and over again 56 00:02:59,020 --> 00:02:56,100 I was on that test stand for a little 57 00:03:02,750 --> 00:02:59,030 over a year I guess and went back to the 58 00:03:05,570 --> 00:03:02,760 program office and worked there for for 59 00:03:07,580 --> 00:03:05,580 a while and I did was involved in one 60 00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:07,590 more thing there in the qualification we 61 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:10,050 it was difficult to get the number of 62 00:03:16,250 --> 00:03:13,010 tests off that you needed to qualify 63 00:03:19,310 --> 00:03:16,260 particularly the main fuel valve which 64 00:03:23,060 --> 00:03:19,320 had been redesigned and had to be 65 00:03:26,390 --> 00:03:23,070 requalified so I came up with the idea 66 00:03:28,960 --> 00:03:26,400 of designing a flow bench where we could 67 00:03:32,120 --> 00:03:28,970 put two of the valves in parallel and 68 00:03:34,699 --> 00:03:32,130 cycle them and never turn the system off 69 00:03:38,300 --> 00:03:34,709 and we were able to get the right kind 70 00:03:40,310 --> 00:03:38,310 of loads on the on the valves and did 71 00:03:44,900 --> 00:03:40,320 that to finish the number of tests we 72 00:03:48,170 --> 00:03:44,910 had to have to to to qualify one of the 73 00:03:53,080 --> 00:03:48,180 most critical issues in the program was 74 00:03:57,860 --> 00:03:53,090 the instability of the f1 engine the f1 75 00:04:00,610 --> 00:03:57,870 injector and that problem was eventually 76 00:04:03,289 --> 00:04:00,620 solved frankly by trial and error 77 00:04:05,990 --> 00:04:03,299 you know the analytical capability in 78 00:04:08,210 --> 00:04:06,000 those days was not good enough to really 79 00:04:09,949 --> 00:04:08,220 investigate what the flow field was like 80 00:04:11,479 --> 00:04:09,959 or what was going on and as a matter of 81 00:04:14,960 --> 00:04:11,489 fact it's still not good enough to do 82 00:04:18,920 --> 00:04:14,970 that with any fidelity so the plan was 83 00:04:21,860 --> 00:04:18,930 to just design and test injectors until 84 00:04:24,830 --> 00:04:21,870 they found one that that was stable and 85 00:04:26,719 --> 00:04:24,840 they did that but one of the things that 86 00:04:30,140 --> 00:04:26,729 I did while I was working on the test 87 00:04:36,920 --> 00:04:30,150 and was the f1 was basically a scaled up 88 00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:36,930 h1 was a the f1 was 105 one point five 89 00:04:41,200 --> 00:04:38,210 million then 90 00:04:42,940 --> 00:04:41,210 the h1 was around 200,000 but 91 00:04:45,880 --> 00:04:42,950 essentially it was scaled up in a lot of 92 00:04:48,760 --> 00:04:45,890 respects so the thought was and and the 93 00:04:51,310 --> 00:04:48,770 h1 engine was stable as rock you 94 00:04:53,620 --> 00:04:51,320 couldn't move it but they decided they 95 00:04:55,150 --> 00:04:53,630 wanted to try to drive it unstable so 96 00:04:58,840 --> 00:04:55,160 they could look at what was happening in 97 00:05:01,770 --> 00:04:58,850 the combustion chamber so we put charges 98 00:05:05,620 --> 00:05:01,780 screwed charges into the injector and we 99 00:05:08,350 --> 00:05:05,630 start the engine ignited and and ignite 100 00:05:10,630 --> 00:05:08,360 the charge and you'd see a pulse in 101 00:05:13,090 --> 00:05:10,640 there but we were never able to get in 102 00:05:16,210 --> 00:05:13,100 any instability in the h1 but you know 103 00:05:18,190 --> 00:05:16,220 it wasn't hectic it was Ortoli and you 104 00:05:21,220 --> 00:05:18,200 know the process was there and and 105 00:05:23,680 --> 00:05:21,230 people were working hard every day but 106 00:05:25,570 --> 00:05:23,690 there was no I never had a feeling of 107 00:05:27,700 --> 00:05:25,580 pressure pressure of course I was done 108 00:05:28,690 --> 00:05:27,710 in the organization I'm sure that some 109 00:05:29,920 --> 00:05:28,700 of the people higher up in the 110 00:05:31,480 --> 00:05:29,930 organization had some pressure 111 00:05:38,290 --> 00:05:31,490 particularly with the instability 112 00:05:41,650 --> 00:05:38,300 problem but when I went to work there I 113 00:05:44,080 --> 00:05:41,660 had never done anything like that I you 114 00:05:46,710 --> 00:05:44,090 know I was a mechanical engineer but I 115 00:05:49,360 --> 00:05:46,720 didn't even think of a cars very much 116 00:05:51,610 --> 00:05:49,370 and one of the interesting things I did 117 00:05:54,520 --> 00:05:51,620 was that I went through a training 118 00:05:56,050 --> 00:05:54,530 program and they had an ideal training 119 00:05:58,440 --> 00:05:56,060 program to learn this engine because 120 00:06:04,210 --> 00:05:58,450 what I did was went out in the shop and 121 00:06:06,940 --> 00:06:04,220 I stood beside a mechanic's side by his 122 00:06:10,120 --> 00:06:06,950 elbow as he was completely assembling a 123 00:06:11,830 --> 00:06:10,130 liquid oxygen pump and then followed on 124 00:06:15,280 --> 00:06:11,840 through the rest of the engine so I I 125 00:06:17,710 --> 00:06:15,290 learned the engine from inside out with 126 00:06:19,870 --> 00:06:17,720 that with that kind of training I gave 127 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:19,880 my first ever presentation to a group 128 00:06:26,920 --> 00:06:23,690 from Marshall that came out and I was 129 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:26,930 saying I was in the working in the 130 00:06:32,980 --> 00:06:30,170 training program in the turbopump area 131 00:06:36,910 --> 00:06:32,990 and I can't remember the details of what 132 00:06:38,610 --> 00:06:36,920 it was that we had going on but and I we 133 00:06:42,190 --> 00:06:38,620 had done some work and I'd written a 134 00:06:44,230 --> 00:06:42,200 memo on it and the NASA folks came out 135 00:06:45,710 --> 00:06:44,240 to hear about the details of the 136 00:06:50,200 --> 00:06:45,720 investigation this kind 137 00:06:53,030 --> 00:06:50,210 and so I gave my first presentation ever 138 00:06:55,070 --> 00:06:53,040 to that group and we had in those days 139 00:06:57,770 --> 00:06:55,080 you use flip charts you know they were 140 00:07:00,860 --> 00:06:57,780 about 30 inches wide and 20 inches tall 141 00:07:02,270 --> 00:07:00,870 and you'd flip them over and I had a set 142 00:07:04,790 --> 00:07:02,280 of flip charts that I went through with 143 00:07:06,470 --> 00:07:04,800 that tour as a matter of fact I didn't 144 00:07:10,490 --> 00:07:06,480 even have a suit I went out and bought a 145 00:07:13,100 --> 00:07:10,500 suit for the first presentation when I 146 00:07:16,250 --> 00:07:13,110 was at Rocketdyne working on the engines 147 00:07:19,510 --> 00:07:16,260 you know every day working on something 148 00:07:21,950 --> 00:07:19,520 that Marshall had an intense interest in 149 00:07:24,830 --> 00:07:21,960 so everything we were doing was been 150 00:07:27,830 --> 00:07:24,840 transmitted back back to the customer 151 00:07:29,390 --> 00:07:27,840 and then in presentations as well and in 152 00:07:31,880 --> 00:07:29,400 providing information to him and that 153 00:07:34,070 --> 00:07:31,890 came out when I was working at Teledyne 154 00:07:36,800 --> 00:07:34,080 Brown I was in a research department you 155 00:07:38,840 --> 00:07:36,810 know we were given problems to solve 156 00:07:40,640 --> 00:07:38,850 like the one I mentioned to you that 157 00:07:44,870 --> 00:07:40,650 developing the computer program for 158 00:07:46,250 --> 00:07:44,880 their use I also did a they had a nozzle 159 00:07:49,250 --> 00:07:46,260 flow program that had been developed 160 00:07:51,140 --> 00:07:49,260 earlier but it didn't include the 161 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:51,150 rotational flow component in the flow 162 00:07:58,190 --> 00:07:54,810 and I redid all that but it was you know 163 00:08:00,370 --> 00:07:58,200 his arms length we as a matter of fact 164 00:08:03,650 --> 00:08:00,380 they're worse than even any in progress 165 00:08:05,270 --> 00:08:03,660 reviews you do the whole program and 166 00:08:07,550 --> 00:08:05,280 then you'd go sit down with them and 167 00:08:13,019 --> 00:08:07,560 with NASA and tell them what you had and 168 00:08:18,749 --> 00:08:15,949 when I finished my master's degree I 169 00:08:23,039 --> 00:08:18,759 wanted to move into the research area at 170 00:08:24,899 --> 00:08:23,049 at Rocketdyne and they weren't inclined 171 00:08:26,369 --> 00:08:24,909 to do that they wanted me stay where I 172 00:08:28,229 --> 00:08:26,379 was 173 00:08:32,300 --> 00:08:28,239 so I started looking around for 174 00:08:35,610 --> 00:08:32,310 something else and I got in contact with 175 00:08:37,019 --> 00:08:35,620 Brown engineering which wasn't Teledyne 176 00:08:40,800 --> 00:08:37,029 Brown in those days it was just brown 177 00:08:43,949 --> 00:08:40,810 engineering and they had an opening in 178 00:08:46,590 --> 00:08:43,959 their research department and so over a 179 00:08:51,300 --> 00:08:46,600 period of a few weeks took the job and 180 00:08:55,470 --> 00:08:51,310 and and we plan to come back when my my 181 00:08:58,230 --> 00:08:55,480 organization found out that that I was 182 00:08:59,300 --> 00:08:58,240 leaving they all of a sudden offered me 183 00:09:02,670 --> 00:08:59,310 a promotion 184 00:09:05,970 --> 00:09:02,680 increase salary and moved to the 185 00:09:07,499 --> 00:09:05,980 research department but by that time I 186 00:09:12,090 --> 00:09:07,509 had told my wife that we were moving 187 00:09:13,559 --> 00:09:12,100 back south I said I throw my the boss 188 00:09:17,040 --> 00:09:13,569 has to look you can go talk to my wife 189 00:09:19,769 --> 00:09:17,050 as you want to but I'm not gonna do that 190 00:09:24,059 --> 00:09:19,779 so we came back to Brown engineering and 191 00:09:25,949 --> 00:09:24,069 I was there for about three years and 192 00:09:29,699 --> 00:09:25,959 most of the work that I did there was 193 00:09:33,210 --> 00:09:29,709 for NASA almost all of it and one part 194 00:09:36,030 --> 00:09:33,220 of it related to the to the Apollo 195 00:09:38,910 --> 00:09:36,040 program the organization was looking out 196 00:09:41,819 --> 00:09:38,920 beyond the first flights to the moon and 197 00:09:44,780 --> 00:09:41,829 and to what they were going to do to 198 00:09:47,790 --> 00:09:44,790 have habitats there for for the crews 199 00:09:50,639 --> 00:09:47,800 further out in the future and they 200 00:09:53,280 --> 00:09:50,649 needed a computer program that would do 201 00:09:55,769 --> 00:09:53,290 a thermal analysis on bodies that were 202 00:09:59,850 --> 00:09:55,779 placed on the moon and it was you had to 203 00:10:01,499 --> 00:09:59,860 be completely generic it had to be you 204 00:10:03,269 --> 00:10:01,509 had to have been define it inside the 205 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:03,279 computer program and it had to be 206 00:10:07,290 --> 00:10:05,410 variable and it also had to have the 207 00:10:10,379 --> 00:10:07,300 capability of having shades in any 208 00:10:12,420 --> 00:10:10,389 location and so I spent quite some time 209 00:10:14,369 --> 00:10:12,430 probably about a year putting that 210 00:10:17,429 --> 00:10:14,379 program together and delivering it to 211 00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:17,439 NASA lovely work we were doing was for 212 00:10:22,810 --> 00:10:20,050 program development and Charles Darwin 213 00:10:25,139 --> 00:10:22,820 Charlie Darwin was head of program fella 214 00:10:28,840 --> 00:10:25,149 as a matter of fact I gave my first 215 00:10:32,019 --> 00:10:28,850 presentation on site that March took the 216 00:10:36,430 --> 00:10:32,029 Charter Darwin they had had it was a 217 00:10:38,889 --> 00:10:36,440 Lockheed Martin analysis of some kind of 218 00:10:41,079 --> 00:10:38,899 vehicle they had and when they got the 219 00:10:45,190 --> 00:10:41,089 results they couldn't didn't believe it 220 00:10:47,710 --> 00:10:45,200 so they they asked us to go do an 221 00:10:51,070 --> 00:10:47,720 analysis to to check what they had from 222 00:10:52,780 --> 00:10:51,080 from Lockheed Martin and I did the 223 00:10:54,639 --> 00:10:52,790 analysis but together computer program 224 00:10:57,190 --> 00:10:54,649 and did the analysis and got drastically 225 00:10:59,590 --> 00:10:57,200 different results and I also found out 226 00:11:02,560 --> 00:10:59,600 why what had caused their problem with 227 00:11:05,710 --> 00:11:02,570 it they had they had didn't have any 228 00:11:08,590 --> 00:11:05,720 conduction around the circumferentially 229 00:11:11,170 --> 00:11:08,600 around the vehicle and so that gave 230 00:11:12,970 --> 00:11:11,180 grossly different thermals us so I came 231 00:11:15,240 --> 00:11:12,980 out and presented all that to Charlie 232 00:11:22,130 --> 00:11:15,250 Darwin that was my first on-site 233 00:11:27,470 --> 00:11:24,370 to Huntsville for that interview trip I 234 00:11:32,170 --> 00:11:27,480 came a flew over from Atlanta in a dc-3 235 00:11:36,260 --> 00:11:32,180 and never been in this area at all and 236 00:11:39,500 --> 00:11:36,270 the plane landed and I got up and 237 00:11:40,880 --> 00:11:39,510 started to get out and somebody told me 238 00:11:45,110 --> 00:11:40,890 that I hadn't gotten to Huntsville yeah 239 00:11:46,640 --> 00:11:45,120 this is muscle shows so I thought the 240 00:11:49,010 --> 00:11:46,650 plane would land at Huntsville first I 241 00:11:51,200 --> 00:11:49,020 knew it was going to motion show but you 242 00:11:53,630 --> 00:11:51,210 know flew in over the rock quarry to the 243 00:11:57,170 --> 00:11:53,640 old airport 244 00:12:02,920 --> 00:11:57,180 the town was relatively small in those 245 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:02,930 days and growth has been been fantastic 246 00:12:09,290 --> 00:12:05,370 most of it due to the space program and 247 00:12:11,120 --> 00:12:09,300 to the Redstone Arsenal of course there 248 00:12:13,850 --> 00:12:11,130 were there were a few companies here 249 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:13,860 then but now you know anybody and 250 00:12:27,660 --> 00:12:24,150 I had a friend who had actually been at 251 00:12:31,259 --> 00:12:27,670 Rocketdyne Terre Greenwood who had come 252 00:12:33,090 --> 00:12:31,269 to NASA directly from Rocketdyne he came 253 00:12:34,920 --> 00:12:33,100 over to our place when one day and he 254 00:12:38,090 --> 00:12:34,930 said hey look he said Marshall has 255 00:12:40,650 --> 00:12:38,100 started a new graduate co-op program I 256 00:12:43,139 --> 00:12:40,660 said the deal is they'll give you half 257 00:12:45,499 --> 00:12:43,149 salary while you're at school and let 258 00:12:50,639 --> 00:12:45,509 you go work on your PhD and by that time 259 00:12:52,259 --> 00:12:50,649 I had accumulated in addition to what I 260 00:12:55,530 --> 00:12:52,269 had on my Master's I'd accumulated 261 00:12:57,929 --> 00:12:55,540 another 27 semester hours working at UAH 262 00:13:01,889 --> 00:12:57,939 so I was ready to try to finish it off 263 00:13:05,280 --> 00:13:01,899 so I came out to talk to the coop 264 00:13:07,410 --> 00:13:05,290 department about that and told them you 265 00:13:09,480 --> 00:13:07,420 know who it was and what I was and what 266 00:13:11,249 --> 00:13:09,490 I wanted to do and they said you don't 267 00:13:13,860 --> 00:13:11,259 really understand he said this is for 268 00:13:15,960 --> 00:13:13,870 people who work at NASA so I said well 269 00:13:17,879 --> 00:13:15,970 if you hire me I'll be a nicer employee 270 00:13:21,150 --> 00:13:17,889 and then I they said oh no we can't do 271 00:13:25,259 --> 00:13:21,160 that so I had about three visits with 272 00:13:27,929 --> 00:13:25,269 him and finally they hired me so I came 273 00:13:31,019 --> 00:13:27,939 out here in May 274 00:13:33,480 --> 00:13:31,029 and what University of Texas that fall 275 00:13:36,210 --> 00:13:33,490 and finished up all the coursework and 276 00:13:37,470 --> 00:13:36,220 qualifying exams and all that then came 277 00:13:40,259 --> 00:13:37,480 back to Marshall and did my dissertation 278 00:13:43,019 --> 00:13:40,269 here using the drop tower what I was 279 00:13:47,100 --> 00:13:43,029 looking at was reduced gravity nucleate 280 00:13:49,980 --> 00:13:47,110 boiling and I used freon 113 a test 281 00:13:53,549 --> 00:13:49,990 really put together a test rig and the 282 00:13:55,199 --> 00:13:53,559 dock drop tower was not frankly even 283 00:13:57,119 --> 00:13:55,209 being used at that time but they had 284 00:13:58,530 --> 00:13:57,129 some equipment that they'd used for 285 00:14:01,139 --> 00:13:58,540 earlier experiments so I used that 286 00:14:04,439 --> 00:14:01,149 equipment set it up in the drop tower 287 00:14:06,929 --> 00:14:04,449 and studied I would start the nucleate 288 00:14:08,790 --> 00:14:06,939 boiling then get out of the shield and 289 00:14:12,119 --> 00:14:08,800 they'd drop it and I had it you know 290 00:14:14,150 --> 00:14:12,129 data and in pictures all the way down so 291 00:14:18,179 --> 00:14:14,160 I that's the way I got the data for my 292 00:14:22,439 --> 00:14:18,189 dissertation while I was here working on 293 00:14:25,290 --> 00:14:22,449 my dissertation there getting involved 294 00:14:28,350 --> 00:14:25,300 already in the Skylab broker that was 295 00:14:37,170 --> 00:14:28,360 getting cranked up and defined 296 00:14:39,090 --> 00:14:37,180 so I I as soon as I finished the PhD my 297 00:14:40,769 --> 00:14:39,100 boss Charlie would at the time called me 298 00:14:43,439 --> 00:14:40,779 in and asked me what I wanted to do and 299 00:14:47,460 --> 00:14:43,449 I told everyone to stay and they had a 300 00:14:49,499 --> 00:14:47,470 section chief job that was open so he 301 00:14:55,309 --> 00:14:49,509 offered that to me and I and I took it 302 00:14:59,189 --> 00:14:55,319 and so I worked from that time until 303 00:15:02,179 --> 00:14:59,199 after launch of Skylab I was 100% on the 304 00:15:05,489 --> 00:15:02,189 Skylab program we had I had 305 00:15:08,610 --> 00:15:05,499 environmental control branch we also did 306 00:15:12,059 --> 00:15:08,620 thermal work so I was responsible for 307 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:12,069 the environmental control system the 308 00:15:16,980 --> 00:15:13,930 interesting thing about that was it was 309 00:15:20,429 --> 00:15:16,990 the first time we'd had an active 310 00:15:24,900 --> 00:15:20,439 control system for carbon dioxide on 311 00:15:27,110 --> 00:15:24,910 Apollo and all the capsules they used 312 00:15:30,239 --> 00:15:27,120 lifting the Drakh side canisters and 313 00:15:32,549 --> 00:15:30,249 they would use they would be used up you 314 00:15:34,980 --> 00:15:32,559 know after a while and yet to replace 315 00:15:37,980 --> 00:15:34,990 them a couple of days I think so there's 316 00:15:40,040 --> 00:15:37,990 a lot of mass involved in that and we 317 00:15:43,079 --> 00:15:40,050 were gonna be on orbit you know for 318 00:15:47,340 --> 00:15:43,089 months and months so we couldn't afford 319 00:15:50,790 --> 00:15:47,350 the weight to do that so we developed it 320 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:50,800 was actually developed by McDonnell 321 00:15:56,669 --> 00:15:54,730 Douglas East and in st. Louis molecular 322 00:15:59,460 --> 00:15:56,679 cell system which was regenerative you 323 00:16:01,259 --> 00:15:59,470 it would absorb the carbon dioxide and a 324 00:16:03,030 --> 00:16:01,269 material and then you would switch it 325 00:16:05,910 --> 00:16:03,040 over and put that to vacuum and the 326 00:16:07,319 --> 00:16:05,920 vacuum would put it out to space so it 327 00:16:09,540 --> 00:16:07,329 was a regenerative system worked 328 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:09,550 beautifully never had any problems with 329 00:16:18,170 --> 00:16:15,860 yeah one of one of the interesting 330 00:16:22,460 --> 00:16:18,180 things of course during this period of 331 00:16:24,139 --> 00:16:22,470 time we had we talked about being in a 332 00:16:27,710 --> 00:16:24,149 race with the Russians to get to the 333 00:16:29,569 --> 00:16:27,720 moon and and we were in a race with them 334 00:16:31,490 --> 00:16:29,579 you know we knew that they had fantastic 335 00:16:35,449 --> 00:16:31,500 capability they put the first satellite 336 00:16:38,230 --> 00:16:35,459 up they put the first man in orbit but 337 00:16:40,579 --> 00:16:38,240 we never knew what they were doing they 338 00:16:42,970 --> 00:16:40,589 they knew everything we were doing and 339 00:16:46,699 --> 00:16:42,980 we knew nothing that they were doing and 340 00:16:50,690 --> 00:16:46,709 frankly didn't find out a lot about it 341 00:16:52,310 --> 00:16:50,700 until after the wall came down and we 342 00:16:53,870 --> 00:16:52,320 started having interactions with the 343 00:16:57,170 --> 00:16:53,880 Russians 344 00:17:00,530 --> 00:16:57,180 I had an visited Russia a number of 345 00:17:04,069 --> 00:17:00,540 times several times when I was deputy 346 00:17:06,140 --> 00:17:04,079 director marshal when I was chief 347 00:17:08,840 --> 00:17:06,150 engineer and NASA chief engineer and and 348 00:17:09,829 --> 00:17:08,850 when I was administrator I also visited 349 00:17:12,260 --> 00:17:09,839 several times 350 00:17:17,569 --> 00:17:12,270 some of them looking at engines other 351 00:17:20,270 --> 00:17:17,579 with Space Station things but the 352 00:17:24,500 --> 00:17:20,280 interesting thing relative to that race 353 00:17:25,880 --> 00:17:24,510 was that I think was about it must have 354 00:17:27,860 --> 00:17:25,890 been the SEC it wasn't the first it must 355 00:17:30,289 --> 00:17:27,870 have been the second or the third trip I 356 00:17:31,820 --> 00:17:30,299 took to Russia mostly I was dealing with 357 00:17:33,710 --> 00:17:31,830 the engine companies looking at their 358 00:17:36,049 --> 00:17:33,720 engines and how they developed and 359 00:17:38,960 --> 00:17:36,059 building of what they could do at NP 360 00:17:42,830 --> 00:17:38,970 under Gamache at kemp key right outside 361 00:17:44,360 --> 00:17:42,840 of Russia and cdb and veronik but when 362 00:17:47,840 --> 00:17:44,370 one of those visits second of the third 363 00:17:49,880 --> 00:17:47,850 one I went to visit an ERG yeah and they 364 00:17:53,539 --> 00:17:49,890 were responsible for the design 365 00:17:55,669 --> 00:17:53,549 development of launch vehicles and they 366 00:17:57,740 --> 00:17:55,679 had been responsible back in the days 367 00:18:01,520 --> 00:17:57,750 when we had the moon race going on for 368 00:18:06,440 --> 00:18:01,530 the their designation was the n1 launch 369 00:18:09,380 --> 00:18:06,450 vehicle and we had a nice visit with 370 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:09,390 them and all of a sudden something 371 00:18:15,530 --> 00:18:12,210 totally unexpected they started showing 372 00:18:20,030 --> 00:18:15,540 me movies of their launch failures of 373 00:18:24,230 --> 00:18:20,040 the n1 and they discussed it very openly 374 00:18:25,580 --> 00:18:24,240 and they told me how they had come up 375 00:18:30,650 --> 00:18:25,590 short but 376 00:18:33,140 --> 00:18:30,660 and had not beat us to the moon they we 377 00:18:37,670 --> 00:18:33,150 had the f1 engine which is in you know 378 00:18:41,080 --> 00:18:37,680 million half pounds of thrust and they 379 00:18:43,970 --> 00:18:41,090 at that time did not have a large engine 380 00:18:46,460 --> 00:18:43,980 their engines it was in fifteen I think 381 00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:46,470 was their designation for it was a much 382 00:18:53,300 --> 00:18:49,950 much smaller engine they had and because 383 00:18:57,020 --> 00:18:53,310 of that they had in the mid 30 or 35 384 00:19:00,140 --> 00:18:57,030 engines in their first stage and you can 385 00:19:03,440 --> 00:19:00,150 imagine a plumbing nightmare with all 386 00:19:08,840 --> 00:19:03,450 the plumbing that feeds propellant 235 387 00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:08,850 engines and what we did was when we 388 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:12,450 developed our booster we did a total 389 00:19:18,950 --> 00:19:14,730 system test we tested the whole stage 390 00:19:20,480 --> 00:19:18,960 many many times so that we we knew the 391 00:19:23,150 --> 00:19:20,490 plumbing the flow was going to be right 392 00:19:26,720 --> 00:19:23,160 nope no excess vibrations or anything in 393 00:19:29,390 --> 00:19:26,730 there but they didn't do that they they 394 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:29,400 never ever tested that first stage 395 00:19:34,160 --> 00:19:32,610 completely assembled they launched it 396 00:19:37,550 --> 00:19:34,170 without ever doing that test and they 397 00:19:40,190 --> 00:19:37,560 did it they did it to save time to try 398 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:40,200 to beat us to the moon if they had if 399 00:19:43,970 --> 00:19:42,690 they had done those tests they they 400 00:19:47,990 --> 00:19:43,980 probably wouldn't have beaten us because 401 00:19:53,150 --> 00:19:48,000 they didn't try a launch until it was in 402 00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:53,160 69 I think but you know they were lower 403 00:19:56,210 --> 00:19:54,810 there would have been later than that if 404 00:19:59,210 --> 00:19:56,220 they had taken the time to go do that 405 00:20:01,280 --> 00:19:59,220 and and even if even if they're taking 406 00:20:03,380 --> 00:20:01,290 the time with a complex situation they 407 00:20:07,150 --> 00:20:03,390 had they they might or might not have 408 00:20:09,860 --> 00:20:07,160 made it work but not doing the testing 409 00:20:13,250 --> 00:20:09,870 doomed them to failure and and they knew 410 00:20:15,170 --> 00:20:13,260 that and the the people I were talking 411 00:20:17,360 --> 00:20:15,180 to some of them were people who had been 412 00:20:20,360 --> 00:20:17,370 there in that time and they weren't just 413 00:20:21,500 --> 00:20:20,370 telling stories from from what they had 414 00:20:24,770 --> 00:20:21,510 heard they were telling you what 415 00:20:31,580 --> 00:20:24,780 happened they also had their chief 416 00:20:33,650 --> 00:20:31,590 designer had died in 1965 and that hurt 417 00:20:35,600 --> 00:20:33,660 the program a lot and another thing that 418 00:20:36,630 --> 00:20:35,610 hurt them and this is another story they 419 00:20:39,130 --> 00:20:36,640 told 420 00:20:42,279 --> 00:20:39,140 they and they were getting a lot of 421 00:20:45,100 --> 00:20:42,289 pressure having these failures from from 422 00:20:49,480 --> 00:20:45,110 higher-ups and they were getting ready 423 00:20:52,299 --> 00:20:49,490 to to do another launch and they were 424 00:20:54,659 --> 00:20:52,309 getting again with this pressure and in 425 00:20:57,039 --> 00:20:54,669 order to show confidence his confidence 426 00:21:00,279 --> 00:20:57,049 that they were going to do this and it's 427 00:21:03,340 --> 00:21:00,289 going to be successful he took quite a 428 00:21:06,520 --> 00:21:03,350 significant number of his key people and 429 00:21:09,880 --> 00:21:06,530 went out close to the launch pad and the 430 00:21:12,430 --> 00:21:09,890 launch failed and killed all of them so 431 00:21:17,760 --> 00:21:12,440 that left a hole in their in their 432 00:21:25,230 --> 00:21:21,560 well the most memorable was Apollo 11 433 00:21:30,240 --> 00:21:25,240 because that was the first launch I'd 434 00:21:32,279 --> 00:21:30,250 ever gone to and of any kind and my wife 435 00:21:36,389 --> 00:21:32,289 and I went down and watched it from the 436 00:21:38,779 --> 00:21:36,399 causeway at the Cape and that's still 437 00:21:41,909 --> 00:21:38,789 the most fantastic launch I've ever seen 438 00:21:44,130 --> 00:21:41,919 just to see that thing you know slowly 439 00:21:47,700 --> 00:21:44,140 move up off the pad and it was just and 440 00:21:52,169 --> 00:21:47,710 knowing all that had gone into it it was 441 00:21:56,940 --> 00:21:52,179 just a fantastic experience we came back 442 00:21:59,370 --> 00:21:56,950 and I watched the landing in my den on 443 00:22:03,570 --> 00:21:59,380 TV Walter contract 444 00:22:07,500 --> 00:22:03,580 Cronkite was narrating and my wife and I 445 00:22:09,389 --> 00:22:07,510 watched that on TV so that you know that 446 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:09,399 that's the memorable event there's 447 00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:12,730 nothing more memorable than that 448 00:22:17,070 --> 00:22:15,010 well you know in the moment watching 449 00:22:19,169 --> 00:22:17,080 that there was nothing on my mind except 450 00:22:21,990 --> 00:22:19,179 what I was watching and you know I had 451 00:22:24,299 --> 00:22:22,000 done this other work but you know to see 452 00:22:28,769 --> 00:22:24,309 what we were seeing is was beyond belief 453 00:22:31,409 --> 00:22:28,779 you know that that program and you know 454 00:22:34,919 --> 00:22:31,419 the way it was started and you know nine 455 00:22:39,630 --> 00:22:34,929 years plus we were actually landing on 456 00:22:40,919 --> 00:22:39,640 the moon was hard to believe even though 457 00:22:43,110 --> 00:22:40,929 I'd worked on it and you what they were 458 00:22:45,990 --> 00:22:43,120 doing I'm watching it it's still hard to 459 00:22:47,940 --> 00:22:46,000 believe and you know I didn't really 460 00:22:53,639 --> 00:22:47,950 relate it to anything else at that time 461 00:22:55,710 --> 00:22:53,649 and I after that we went I think maybe 462 00:22:56,460 --> 00:22:55,720 and I went to one more launch and I came 463 00:22:59,010 --> 00:22:56,470 from which one it was 464 00:23:02,130 --> 00:22:59,020 there's probably 14 or 15 something like 465 00:23:06,269 --> 00:23:02,140 that and took our children to that one 466 00:23:10,169 --> 00:23:06,279 same same thing on the causeway our our 467 00:23:12,960 --> 00:23:10,179 sonim was about two years old and our 468 00:23:15,750 --> 00:23:12,970 daughter was about five I think and 469 00:23:18,269 --> 00:23:15,760 Beebe had made outfits for them red 470 00:23:19,590 --> 00:23:18,279 white and blue outfits and we have a 471 00:23:23,940 --> 00:23:19,600 picture of them sitting on the hood of 472 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:23,950 our car at that launch so and that was 473 00:23:40,140 --> 00:23:35,650 there was some uncertainty because what 474 00:23:41,740 --> 00:23:40,150 we what we had in staffing levels was 475 00:23:44,940 --> 00:23:41,750 more than we needed 476 00:23:48,790 --> 00:23:44,950 in cases as a matter of fact we had one 477 00:23:52,570 --> 00:23:48,800 reduction in force they might have been 478 00:23:54,040 --> 00:23:52,580 two but no there was one so even though 479 00:23:56,950 --> 00:23:54,050 makes purple nervous when you start 480 00:24:01,120 --> 00:23:56,960 doing that the workload wasn't going to 481 00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:01,130 be as heavy as we had and we had you 482 00:24:04,900 --> 00:24:03,770 know I think in Apollo probably 6,000 483 00:24:08,770 --> 00:24:04,910 people here 484 00:24:11,260 --> 00:24:08,780 we had a large Kadri of technicians and 485 00:24:13,930 --> 00:24:11,270 people who did work in the work on the 486 00:24:16,210 --> 00:24:13,940 hardware and in the machine shops and 487 00:24:19,450 --> 00:24:16,220 those kind of things and that was phased 488 00:24:24,100 --> 00:24:19,460 down almost completely out after Apollo 489 00:24:25,690 --> 00:24:24,110 so a lot of that went away the size of 490 00:24:28,650 --> 00:24:25,700 the you know the engineering 491 00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:28,660 organization didn't change significantly 492 00:24:34,900 --> 00:24:31,250 but a lot of the peripheral stuff was 493 00:24:37,630 --> 00:24:34,910 was changed but you know it to me it 494 00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:37,640 wasn't so much a trans transition 495 00:24:43,660 --> 00:24:39,530 between Apollo and something else 496 00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:43,670 because when I came here again I started 497 00:24:47,860 --> 00:24:45,410 working right away on Skylab so I was 498 00:24:52,210 --> 00:24:47,870 working on the next thing already 499 00:24:57,520 --> 00:24:52,220 and then that flowed and to shuttle 500 00:24:59,500 --> 00:24:57,530 pretty quickly we were also involved 501 00:25:02,110 --> 00:24:59,510 with the Europeans and developing Space 502 00:25:04,210 --> 00:25:02,120 Lab and I was a part of the head I spent 503 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:04,220 some time working I had a branch by that 504 00:25:09,160 --> 00:25:05,570 time and we had several people in the 505 00:25:10,930 --> 00:25:09,170 branch you were working on that we did 506 00:25:13,960 --> 00:25:10,940 some end but a lot of independent work 507 00:25:17,050 --> 00:25:13,970 analysis on our own to check what they 508 00:25:20,760 --> 00:25:17,060 were doing so it was you know it's kind 509 00:25:23,260 --> 00:25:20,770 of a from my viewpoint it was it was a 510 00:25:25,060 --> 00:25:23,270 transfer in the engineering and the work 511 00:25:26,860 --> 00:25:25,070 I was doing and it didn't change very 512 00:25:29,470 --> 00:25:26,870 much I mean you know it's still it was 513 00:25:30,730 --> 00:25:29,480 still there the Sutton and I said like I 514 00:25:32,460 --> 00:25:30,740 said the size of the engineering 515 00:25:34,570 --> 00:25:32,470 organization didn't change significantly 516 00:25:36,250 --> 00:25:34,580 when I was director of science and 517 00:25:39,560 --> 00:25:36,260 engineering I think we had still had 518 00:25:41,600 --> 00:25:39,570 2,300 people in science and engineering 519 00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:41,610 and the sounds part of that was probably 520 00:25:50,070 --> 00:25:44,610 a hundred and fifty so most of it was 521 00:26:05,700 --> 00:25:57,870 they very quickly moved into areas that 522 00:26:11,730 --> 00:26:05,710 we did not in the kerosene locks engines 523 00:26:14,549 --> 00:26:11,740 which is what the F 1 and H 1 were we 524 00:26:16,740 --> 00:26:14,559 had we knew there were better ways to do 525 00:26:20,490 --> 00:26:16,750 this to get more efficiencies to get 526 00:26:23,639 --> 00:26:20,500 more thrust but we were afraid to do it 527 00:26:26,669 --> 00:26:23,649 because that they and they stepped into 528 00:26:33,269 --> 00:26:26,679 it that they had they developed very 529 00:26:37,320 --> 00:26:33,279 early high pressure combined-cycle locks 530 00:26:39,539 --> 00:26:37,330 rich engine blocks rich fuel what that 531 00:26:44,430 --> 00:26:39,549 is is there are sections in the engines 532 00:26:46,169 --> 00:26:44,440 where you have free oxygen you have more 533 00:26:47,669 --> 00:26:46,179 oxygen and fuel so it's a fuels not 534 00:26:49,830 --> 00:26:47,679 completely burned you have oxygen in 535 00:26:51,870 --> 00:26:49,840 those passages and of very high 536 00:26:53,879 --> 00:26:51,880 temperatures and we were always 537 00:26:55,350 --> 00:26:53,889 concerned if you had areas like that in 538 00:26:57,570 --> 00:26:55,360 an engine and you had a particle go 539 00:27:00,710 --> 00:26:57,580 through and it vertically scratched the 540 00:27:03,480 --> 00:27:00,720 surface now it's gone 541 00:27:05,039 --> 00:27:03,490 they solved that and that was one of my 542 00:27:07,649 --> 00:27:05,049 first questions to around the world as 543 00:27:12,450 --> 00:27:07,659 you saw this problem well we developed a 544 00:27:14,850 --> 00:27:12,460 coating and to go in those those oxygen 545 00:27:16,799 --> 00:27:14,860 rich areas I said well how in the world 546 00:27:20,129 --> 00:27:16,809 did you've ever verified the coating 547 00:27:21,810 --> 00:27:20,139 worked I said oh no problem said we 548 00:27:23,970 --> 00:27:21,820 started a test and we've purposefully 549 00:27:24,930 --> 00:27:23,980 injected particles through those areas 550 00:27:28,889 --> 00:27:24,940 and it didn't blow up 551 00:27:31,200 --> 00:27:28,899 therefore it work so they you know they 552 00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:31,210 they could very quickly went to a much 553 00:27:37,639 --> 00:27:33,970 more sophisticated high performance 554 00:27:41,460 --> 00:27:37,649 engine than we did actually we we did 555 00:27:44,159 --> 00:27:41,470 nothing really beyond the technology 556 00:27:46,350 --> 00:27:44,169 that we used on Saturn for that 557 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:46,360 particular engine that we had the oxygen 558 00:27:49,830 --> 00:27:48,010 hydrogen engines were the same kind of 559 00:27:53,730 --> 00:27:49,840 engines they but they didn't have to 560 00:27:57,810 --> 00:27:53,740 worry about the LOX rich in 561 00:27:58,860 --> 00:27:57,820 but they they were very very good at 562 00:28:01,470 --> 00:27:58,870 engine developments one of the 563 00:28:03,060 --> 00:28:01,480 interesting things is when I first 564 00:28:07,019 --> 00:28:03,070 started going there they didn't want us 565 00:28:09,180 --> 00:28:07,029 to see the injectors so they would 566 00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:09,190 always have a something hanging over the 567 00:28:14,460 --> 00:28:12,010 injector but later on you know we we get 568 00:28:17,130 --> 00:28:14,470 into working below us at Pratt Whitney 569 00:28:19,169 --> 00:28:17,140 we were developing the hardly 180g 570 00:28:21,389 --> 00:28:19,179 engines they were developing it Pratt 571 00:28:23,279 --> 00:28:21,399 Whitney was paying for it but we worked 572 00:28:25,529 --> 00:28:23,289 very closely with him in that and we got 573 00:28:27,990 --> 00:28:25,539 to know everything in the engine but 574 00:28:31,889 --> 00:28:28,000 there their large engine which was the 575 00:28:35,850 --> 00:28:31,899 RT 170 the rd-180 was actually a half of 576 00:28:39,029 --> 00:28:35,860 that engine but the RT 170 rather than 577 00:28:40,980 --> 00:28:39,039 having a large combustion chamber like 578 00:28:44,639 --> 00:28:40,990 we had on the f1 it had actually had 579 00:28:47,789 --> 00:28:44,649 four nozzles for combustion chambers and 580 00:28:50,490 --> 00:28:47,799 I've always thought not never been 100% 581 00:28:52,370 --> 00:28:50,500 sure that that was one of the things 582 00:28:55,620 --> 00:28:52,380 they did to avoid the combustion 583 00:28:58,380 --> 00:28:55,630 instability problem was there was for 584 00:28:59,399 --> 00:28:58,390 having four chambers but they you know 585 00:29:02,940 --> 00:28:59,409 they were they were had very 586 00:29:04,799 --> 00:29:02,950 sophisticated engines their engineers 587 00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:04,809 were fantastic I used to work with them 588 00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:09,130 you know I just when I was going over 589 00:29:14,940 --> 00:29:11,890 there while I was with NASA they were 590 00:29:17,970 --> 00:29:14,950 telling us all about the 31 170 engine 591 00:29:21,180 --> 00:29:17,980 and all have was designed except for 592 00:29:22,830 --> 00:29:21,190 coding kind of things and I kept 593 00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:22,840 pressing and I was trying to find out 594 00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:25,210 what requirements they had used to 595 00:29:30,000 --> 00:29:28,330 develop this engine I had asked him 596 00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:30,010 numerous times what kind of safety 597 00:29:36,750 --> 00:29:33,610 factor did use and finally after two 598 00:29:40,320 --> 00:29:36,760 three days of this the guy found one of 599 00:29:42,330 --> 00:29:40,330 the guy who spoke English real well said 600 00:29:45,090 --> 00:29:42,340 look we can't tell you that said these 601 00:29:47,340 --> 00:29:45,100 are military specs that we used to 602 00:29:50,549 --> 00:29:47,350 develop this thing he said we cannot 603 00:29:51,840 --> 00:29:50,559 tell you what the safety factor is he 604 00:29:54,779 --> 00:29:51,850 said but I'm gonna come in here tomorrow 605 00:29:57,600 --> 00:29:54,789 and show you something and let you 606 00:29:59,970 --> 00:29:57,610 decide he came in the next day and 607 00:30:04,169 --> 00:29:59,980 rolled out of drawing all the way eight 608 00:30:06,299 --> 00:30:04,179 feet long that had in each lot of the 609 00:30:07,710 --> 00:30:06,309 areas of the engine they had calculated 610 00:30:11,160 --> 00:30:07,720 the safety factor 611 00:30:12,660 --> 00:30:11,170 he had written it down and you can look 612 00:30:14,190 --> 00:30:12,670 at all the safety factors she's written 613 00:30:18,570 --> 00:30:14,200 down there and I said aha 614 00:30:22,200 --> 00:30:18,580 one point for just like ours when I was 615 00:30:25,140 --> 00:30:22,210 there we had a meetings in a big 616 00:30:26,370 --> 00:30:25,150 conference room long table you know 617 00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:26,380 which sit around there and meetings with 618 00:30:31,680 --> 00:30:28,450 but it was a very big room and all the 619 00:30:33,570 --> 00:30:31,690 rest of that room was engines and the 620 00:30:37,980 --> 00:30:33,580 first thing they did the first meeting I 621 00:30:39,390 --> 00:30:37,990 had with them walked in sat down and 622 00:30:42,570 --> 00:30:39,400 they said okay we're gonna give you a 623 00:30:45,180 --> 00:30:42,580 tour of our engines and in the back 624 00:30:48,480 --> 00:30:45,190 corner the back corner where they 625 00:30:50,040 --> 00:30:48,490 started they had a v2 which is the same 626 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:50,050 thing we started with that's what they 627 00:30:57,960 --> 00:30:52,810 started with and then they must have had 628 00:31:01,050 --> 00:30:57,970 in that room 20 or 25 different engines 629 00:31:02,580 --> 00:31:01,060 and they walked through and told them 630 00:31:04,980 --> 00:31:02,590 how the totus how the technology had 631 00:31:06,480 --> 00:31:04,990 changed as they and you know fairly 632 00:31:10,110 --> 00:31:06,490 early on they were into this 633 00:31:14,010 --> 00:31:10,120 high-pressure locks rich stage 634 00:31:17,460 --> 00:31:14,020 combustion but they had at that time 635 00:31:19,260 --> 00:31:17,470 they said they had developed I don't 636 00:31:22,050 --> 00:31:19,270 remember the exact number it was high 637 00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:22,060 50s designed and developed that many 638 00:31:27,960 --> 00:31:25,330 engines and they had put about 20 639 00:31:30,390 --> 00:31:27,970 something in serial production when I 640 00:31:33,630 --> 00:31:30,400 went to Verona SH with the LOX hydrogen 641 00:31:36,390 --> 00:31:33,640 engines found the same thing they had 642 00:31:39,810 --> 00:31:36,400 designed and developed 60 of those type 643 00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:39,820 engines and put some large number in 644 00:31:46,740 --> 00:31:43,290 serial production so you know we we were 645 00:31:49,410 --> 00:31:46,750 constrained financially we we couldn't 646 00:31:50,910 --> 00:31:49,420 just go off and and do these things they 647 00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:50,920 had all the money they needed they had 648 00:31:56,700 --> 00:31:53,170 all the people they needed you know and 649 00:31:57,920 --> 00:31:56,710 and they just did whatever came next we 650 00:32:01,020 --> 00:31:57,930 were never able to do that unfortunately 651 00:32:03,180 --> 00:32:01,030 the open checkbook allowed them to do 652 00:32:06,840 --> 00:32:03,190 what any of us would have liked to do 653 00:32:09,180 --> 00:32:06,850 which is you know you you have a v2 and 654 00:32:11,190 --> 00:32:09,190 you envision the next version of that it 655 00:32:12,660 --> 00:32:11,200 has more capability and does has 656 00:32:14,880 --> 00:32:12,670 different things and you go do that and 657 00:32:17,100 --> 00:32:14,890 you say well I could also do it this way 658 00:32:18,650 --> 00:32:17,110 I can make it improve it by that way so 659 00:32:21,180 --> 00:32:18,660 you know they were making an increment 660 00:32:24,600 --> 00:32:21,190 improvements in their technology and and 661 00:32:26,490 --> 00:32:24,610 in in their engines it's what it looked 662 00:32:28,080 --> 00:32:26,500 like to me am that you you saw that when 663 00:32:30,060 --> 00:32:28,090 they stepped around the engine and told 664 00:32:31,530 --> 00:32:30,070 you you know we did this one and then we 665 00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:31,540 did this one over here and this does 666 00:32:38,810 --> 00:32:33,370 this and this does it you could see an 667 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:43,779 one of the legacies that that was left 668 00:32:52,999 --> 00:32:48,450 by the Apollo program - in my view one 669 00:32:55,430 --> 00:32:53,009 of them was the tremendous success that 670 00:32:59,149 --> 00:32:55,440 Marshall and NASA had with the Apollo 671 00:33:02,749 --> 00:32:59,159 program left us really in good stead 672 00:33:06,049 --> 00:33:02,759 with Congress you know if it was we had 673 00:33:10,700 --> 00:33:06,059 a NASA was looked at as a can-do 674 00:33:13,700 --> 00:33:10,710 organization we can do things and so we 675 00:33:16,580 --> 00:33:13,710 begin to get other branded Marshall and 676 00:33:17,479 --> 00:33:16,590 we branched out significantly we you 677 00:33:21,680 --> 00:33:17,489 know there were four Great observatories 678 00:33:24,710 --> 00:33:21,690 and Marshall did two of them the Hubble 679 00:33:28,190 --> 00:33:24,720 and the Chandra and as a matter of fact 680 00:33:30,169 --> 00:33:28,200 we also developed one of the primary 681 00:33:32,570 --> 00:33:30,179 experiments for the gamma ray 682 00:33:34,970 --> 00:33:32,580 Observatory the burst and transient 683 00:33:36,859 --> 00:33:34,980 source experiment which was wildly 684 00:33:39,139 --> 00:33:36,869 successful thank you I was talking to 685 00:33:41,629 --> 00:33:39,149 Jerry Fishman about that just a couple 686 00:33:44,239 --> 00:33:41,639 of weeks ago we were involved in a lot 687 00:33:47,210 --> 00:33:44,249 of things other than just launch 688 00:33:49,549 --> 00:33:47,220 vehicles and propulsion at the center 689 00:33:53,509 --> 00:33:49,559 and then of course flowed into into 690 00:33:56,899 --> 00:33:53,519 space station so what had been 691 00:34:01,149 --> 00:33:56,909 established by the Saturn program at 692 00:34:03,979 --> 00:34:01,159 Marshall not only left a legacy with 693 00:34:06,279 --> 00:34:03,989 with Congress in the outside world and 694 00:34:10,010 --> 00:34:06,289 helped us to get a lot of other things 695 00:34:13,430 --> 00:34:10,020 but the thing frankly that was most 696 00:34:17,119 --> 00:34:13,440 important to me was the legacy that was 697 00:34:20,329 --> 00:34:17,129 left in the organization their 698 00:34:24,889 --> 00:34:20,339 organizational structure the way 699 00:34:27,289 --> 00:34:24,899 engineering related to the projects and 700 00:34:31,159 --> 00:34:27,299 von Braun of course set that all up he 701 00:34:32,869 --> 00:34:31,169 set up a an organization here which was 702 00:34:34,849 --> 00:34:32,879 technically focused 703 00:34:36,919 --> 00:34:34,859 we had laboratories that were 704 00:34:38,599 --> 00:34:36,929 technically folks in avionics laboratory 705 00:34:42,169 --> 00:34:38,609 tests laboratory materials laboratory 706 00:34:45,500 --> 00:34:42,179 and propulsion vehicle engineering had a 707 00:34:48,319 --> 00:34:45,510 lot of the analytical work in it so 708 00:34:50,540 --> 00:34:48,329 there were laboratories for each and 709 00:34:52,640 --> 00:34:50,550 every major discipline and 710 00:34:55,700 --> 00:34:52,650 in laboratories and the people who 711 00:34:59,120 --> 00:34:55,710 headed those laboratories were von 712 00:35:00,830 --> 00:34:59,130 Braun's board of directors and other 713 00:35:04,130 --> 00:35:00,840 center directors all the way up through 714 00:35:05,810 --> 00:35:04,140 me it was that way I looked to the 715 00:35:08,510 --> 00:35:05,820 laboratories for their technical 716 00:35:11,060 --> 00:35:08,520 expertise we have a design review or a 717 00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:11,070 Flight Readiness review whatever it was 718 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:14,010 those lab directors and their technical 719 00:35:17,930 --> 00:35:15,570 expertise sitting around the table 720 00:35:20,030 --> 00:35:17,940 making sure the projects were doing what 721 00:35:22,940 --> 00:35:20,040 they were supposed to do and engineering 722 00:35:25,460 --> 00:35:22,950 was independent from the projects we we 723 00:35:27,050 --> 00:35:25,470 we had loyalty to the projects we were 724 00:35:29,240 --> 00:35:27,060 the conscience of the projects but the 725 00:35:30,500 --> 00:35:29,250 projects and the projects told us a lot 726 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:30,510 of things they wanted us to do and we 727 00:35:35,450 --> 00:35:33,930 did them but we also made independent 728 00:35:38,060 --> 00:35:35,460 decisions on what we needed to do in 729 00:35:39,980 --> 00:35:38,070 programs and there there were a lot of 730 00:35:41,870 --> 00:35:39,990 places that I saw where we made those 731 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:41,880 independent decisions to go off and do 732 00:35:47,780 --> 00:35:45,210 something which had major impacts on the 733 00:35:50,030 --> 00:35:47,790 projects and programs so it was a 734 00:35:53,660 --> 00:35:50,040 completely different different mindset 735 00:35:56,480 --> 00:35:53,670 and and it didn't change while I was 736 00:36:01,900 --> 00:35:56,490 here and I grew up in that you know I 737 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:04,450 associate director of engineering direct 738 00:36:09,290 --> 00:36:06,210 director of engineering and science 739 00:36:11,720 --> 00:36:09,300 deputy and center director and then 740 00:36:14,630 --> 00:36:11,730 later on director so I grew up in that 741 00:36:16,250 --> 00:36:14,640 system so it was always very comfortable 742 00:36:20,720 --> 00:36:16,260 - everybody knew what everybody was 743 00:36:23,450 --> 00:36:20,730 responsible for and and having the 744 00:36:26,660 --> 00:36:23,460 organization set up that way had one 745 00:36:29,270 --> 00:36:26,670 benefit and I think this was probably in 746 00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:29,280 von Braun's mind when he did it but all 747 00:36:33,650 --> 00:36:30,810 the technical people of a certain age 748 00:36:35,660 --> 00:36:33,660 ilk were together so they fed on each 749 00:36:37,370 --> 00:36:35,670 other they did training in ER training 750 00:36:40,670 --> 00:36:37,380 among each other and they made sure that 751 00:36:44,060 --> 00:36:40,680 they had within that group all of the 752 00:36:46,850 --> 00:36:44,070 expertise that was need to do the job it 753 00:36:50,810 --> 00:36:46,860 demonstrated a capability in this 754 00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:50,820 country to do hard things and do them 755 00:36:57,560 --> 00:36:54,450 well and that I think flowed into a lot 756 00:37:00,480 --> 00:36:57,570 of things well beyond NASA it flowed 757 00:37:05,430 --> 00:37:00,490 into military everywhere 758 00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:05,440 there there's never I'll never have seen 759 00:37:12,810 --> 00:37:10,410 anything that was proposed needed 760 00:37:15,090 --> 00:37:12,820 contemplated that we didn't think we 761 00:37:17,490 --> 00:37:15,100 could do we think this country thinks he 762 00:37:19,350 --> 00:37:17,500 can do anything and it generally can and 763 00:37:21,660 --> 00:37:19,360 I think a lot of that leg and that was 764 00:37:25,230 --> 00:37:21,670 the first really big thing we did when 765 00:37:27,740 --> 00:37:25,240 you think what except for the Manhattan 766 00:37:30,780 --> 00:37:27,750 Project of course that was great but 767 00:37:34,290 --> 00:37:30,790 that was the first big really big you 768 00:37:36,060 --> 00:37:34,300 know went in 1962 stand up and say we're